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1 INTRODUCTION
Between November 27 and December 18, 2013, the Target
Corporation’s network was breached, which became the
second largest credit and debit card breach after the
TJX breach in 2007. In the Target incident, 40 million
credit and debit card numbers and 70 million records of
personal information were stolen. The ordeal cost credit
card unions over two hundred million dollars for just
reissuing cards.
Target Corp. is not the only target of data breaches. Up
to the 23rd of September, 568 data breaches are reported
in the year 2014 [1]. The latest significant breach, i.e., the
Home Depot breach, came to light in September 2014.
As of September 14, it is known that 23 out of 28 Home
Depot stores in the State of Alabama were breached [2].
The entire plot could involve a large portion of the 2,200
Home Depot stores in the states and 287 stores overseas,
which might result in a larger breach than the Target
breach. We list four other significant breaches in the
last two years. The increasing number and scale of data
breach incidents are alarming.
• Sally Beauty Supply discovered in March 2014 that
282,000 cards were stolen [3].
• Neiman Marcus reported that 1.1 million cards were
stolen during July to October, 2013 [4].
• Michaels and Aaron Brother reported that 3 million
cards were stolen from May 2013 to January 2014 [5].
• P.F. Chang’s data breach occurred from September
2013 to June 2014 impacting over 7 million cards [6].
Securing massive amounts of connected systems is
known to be technically challenging, especially for re-
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tailers those possess vast networks across the nation,
like Target and Home Depot. Target security division
attempted to protect their systems and networks against
cyber threats such as malware and data exfiltration. Six
months prior to the breach, Target deployed a well-
known and reputable intrusion and malware detection
service named FireEye [7], which was guided by the
CIA during its early development [8]. Unfortunately,
multiple malware alerts were ignored. Some prevention
functionalities were turned off by the administrators
who were not familiar with the FireEye system. Target
Corp. missed the early discovery of the breach.
This paper analyzes Target’s data breach incident from
both technical and legal perspectives. The description of
the incident and the analysis of the involved malware
explain how flaws in the Target’s network were exploited
and why the breach was undiscovered for weeks. The
Target data breach is still under investigation and there
is no arrest made known to the public. Even if the perpe-
trators are identified, cyber crimes involving extradition
are notorious to prosecute. We discuss the difficulties
of data breach discovery, investigation and prosecution
with respect to legislation and international cooperation.
An earlier incident, TJX data breach in 2007, is presented
as the precedent for arresting and sentencing criminals
committing financial cybercrimes.
As we observe an increasing number of data breaches,
these incidents bring us to rethink the effectiveness of
existing security mechanisms, solutions, deployments
and executions. Credit card breach has a huge negative
impact on every entity in the payment ecosystem, includ-
ing merchants, banks, card associations and customers.
In this paper, we provide several insights into weak
links in the payment ecosystem, specifically in existing
security techniques and practices. We give several best
practice suggestions for merchants and customers to
enforce their data security and to minimize information
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Fig. 1. Timeline of the Target data breach (2013).
leak.
The contributions of our work are summarized as
follows.
• We gather and verify information from multiple
sources and describe the process of the Target data
breach in details (Section 2).
• We provide an in-depth analysis of the major mal-
ware used in the Target breach, including its design
features for circumventing detections as well as the
marketing of the malware (Section 3).
• We discuss the complexities and challenges in
data breach investigation and criminal prosecution,
specifically from the legal perspective. We describe
the TJX breach in 2007 as a precedent for arresting
and sentencing cyber criminals (Section 4).
• We provide three security guidelines for merchants
to enhance their payment system security: i) pay-
ment system integrity enforcement, ii) effective alert
system design, and iii) proper network segmenta-
tion (Section 5).
• We discuss the current status of credit card security,
point out problems in the credit card system, and
give customers best practices to hide their informa-
tion in purchase transactions (Section 6).
2 THE TARGET INCIDENT
The systems and networks of Target Corp. were breached
in November and December, 2013, which results in 40
million card numbers and 70 million personal records
stolen [9]. Multiple parties get involved in the federal
investigation of the incident. The list includes United
State Secret Service, iSIGHT Partners, DELL Secure-
Works, Seculert, the FBI, etc. In addition, companies like
HP, McAfee and IntelCrawler provide analysis of the
discovered malware, i.e., BlackPOS, and the marketing
of the stolen cards.
2.1 Breach Into Target
There are multiple theories on how the criminals ini-
tially hacked into Target, and none of them have yet
been confirmed by Target Corporation. However, the
primary and most well-supported theory is that the
initial breach didn’t actually occur inside Target [10].
Instead, it occurred in a third party vendor, Fazio Me-
chanical Services, which is a heating, ventilation, and
air-conditioning firm.
According to this theory, we present the timeline of
the incident in Fig. 1 and steps of the plot in Fig. 2.
Attackers first penetrated into the Target network with
compromised credentials from Fazio Mechanical. Then
they probed the Target network and pinpointed weak
points to exploit. Some vulnerabilities were used to gain
access to the sensitive data, and others were used to
build the bridge transferring data out of Target. Due
to the weak segmentation between non-sensitive and
sensitive networks inside Target, the attackers accessed
the point of sale networks.
2.1.1 Phase I: Initial Infection
At some point the Fazio Mechanical Services system
was compromised by what is believed to be a Citadel
Trojan [11]. This Trojan was initially installed through
a phishing attempt. Due to the poor security training
and security system of the third party, the Trojan gave
the attackers full range of power over the company’s
system [10]. It is not known if Fazio Mechanical Services
was targeted, or if it was part of a larger phishing
attack to which it just happened to fall victim. But it
is certain that Fazio Mechanical had access to Target’s
Ariba external billing system, or the business section of
Target network.
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Fig. 2. Attack steps of the Target breach.
2.1.2 Phase II: PoS Infection
Due to Target’s poor segmentation of its network, all that
the attackers needed in order to gain access into Target’s
entire system was to access its business section. From
there, they gained access to other parts of the Target
network, including parts of the network that contained
sensitive data. Once they gained access into Target’s
network they started to test installing malware onto the
point of sales devices. The attackers used a form of
point of sales malware called BlackPOS, which is further
discussed in Section 3.
2.1.3 Phase III: Data collection
Once BlackPOS was installed, updated and tested. The
malware started to scan the memory of the point of sales
to read the track information, especially card numbers, of
the cards that are scanned by the card readers connected
to the point of sales devices.
2.1.4 Phase IV: Data exfiltration
The card numbers were then encrypted and moved
from the point of sales devices to internal reposito-
ries, which were compromised machines. During the
breach the attackers took over three FTP servers on
Target’s internal network and carefully chose backdoor
user name “Best1 user” with password “BackupU$r”,
which are normally created by IT management software
Performance Assurance for Microsoft Servers. During peak
times of the day, the malware on the point of sale
devices would send credit card information in bulk to
the closest FTP Server [12]. The stolen card information is
then relayed to other compromised machines and finally
pushed to drop sites in Miami and Brazil [13].
2.1.5 Phase V: Monetization
Sources indicate the stolen credit card information was
aggregated at a server in Russia, and the attackers col-
lected 11 GB data during November and December 2013.
The credit cards from the Target breach were identified
on black market forums for sell [14]. At this point, it is
unclear how these sellers, e.g., Rescator (nick name), is
connected with the stolen card and personal information.
In Section 4.3, we describe the well studied case of TJX
credit card breach. It hints possible paths of peddling
stolen credit cards in the black market.
2.2 Targets Security
Target did not run their systems and networks without
security measures. They had firewalls in place and they
attempted to segment their network using Virtual local
area networks (VLAN) [7]. Target also deployed Fire-
Eye, a well-known network security system, six months
prior to the breach. FireEye provides multiple levels of
security from malware detection to network intrusion
detection system (NIDS).
However, the breach demonstrates that sensitive data
in Target, e.g., credit card information and personal
records, is far from secure. Target failed at detecting or
preventing the breach at several points, among which
we list the four most vital ones:
4• Target did not investigate into the security warnings
generated by multiple security tools, e.g., FireEye,
Symantec, and certain malware auto-removal func-
tionalities were turned off [15].
• Target did not take correct methods to segment their
systems, failing to isolate their sensitive network
assets from easily accessed network sections. The
VLAN technique used for segmentation is reported
easy to get around [16].
• Target did not harden their point of sale terminals,
allowing unauthorized software installation and
configuration. The settings resulted in the spread of
malware and sensitive card information read from
point of sale terminals.
• Target did not apply proper access control on ver-
ities of accounts and groups, especially the ones
from third party partners [17]. The failure resulted in
the initial break-in from the HVAC company Fazio
Mechanical Services Inc.
2.3 After the Breach
The former CEO of the company, Gregg Steinhafel, re-
signed after the breach. Target appointed a new chief
information officer Bob DeRodes and provided details
on enhancing their security with 100 million dollars [18].
The plan includes upgrading insecure point of sale ma-
chines and deploying chip-and-PIN-enabled technology
for payment. Defenses such as better segmentation of the
network, comprehensive log analysis and stricter access
control are also mentioned in the plan.
3 BLACKPOS
BlackPOS, seen on underground forums since February
2013 [19], is believed to be the major malware used in
the data breaches at Target (2013), P.F. Chang’s (2013),
and Home Depot (2014). The malware is a form of
memory scrapper that takes a chunk of a systems mem-
ory and looks for credit card numbers. We describe
the functionalities of BlackPOS captured in the Target
breach, discuss its design features for circumventing
detection techniques, and present the investigations of
POS malware development and marketing.
3.1 Components and Functionalities of BlackPOS
Belonging to the BlackPOS family, the malware discov-
ered in the Target breach is designed to infect Windows-
based POS machines. The functionality of BlacksPOS is
not complicated and we present its components in Fig. 3.
When a POS terminal is infected, the malware registers
itself as a Windows service named “POSWDS”. The
service automatically starts with the operating system,
then i) it scans a list of processes which could interact
with the card reader, and ii) it communicates with a com-
promised server (internal network repository) to upload
retrieved credit card information. Predefined rules apply
for matching the sensitive processes, as well as checking
register service scan process list
start service select process
scan process
check time scan mem chunks
upload log extract track info
program
maintenance
repository
aggregation
data exfiltration
functionalities
BlackPOS
Fig. 3. Components and functionalities of BlackPOS.
Yellow boxes are entry points of different functionalities.
the time before sending obtained credit card numbers.
Only during the busy office hours in the daytime, the
repository aggregation function could be enabled and the
card information is sent to the internal repository.
Memory of target processes are read and analyzed in
chunks, each of which is 10,000,000 bytes. BlackPOS uses
a custom logic to search credit card numbers in the mem-
ory trunks. It is believed that this method is more effi-
cient and incurs less overhead than generally used reg-
ular expressions [20]. Retrieved credit card information
are encrypted and stored in file “C:\WINDOWS\system
32\winxml.dll” and then periodically uploaded to the
internal repository via NetBIOS and SMB protocols.
3.2 Design Features for Evading Detections
BlackPOS evolves quickly during the past few years.
The earliest versions of it are discovered by McAfee
in November 2011 as PWS-FBOI and BackDoor-FBPP.
They only contain the bare-bone logic for retrieving
and leaking sensitive information from individual ma-
chines [21]. However, the modern versions – known to
be used in the Target breach (2013) and the Neiman Mar-
cus breach (2013) – are heavily customized for specific
internal networks and perform sophisticated behaviors
to hide themselves from common detection mechanisms.
We detail multiple observed behaviors of BlackPOS in
the Target breach to illustrate how it is designed to
circumvent detections.
• Multi-phase data exfiltration. Infected POS terminals
do not send sensitive data to the external network
directly. Instead, they gather data to a compromised
internal server, which is used as a repository and
5one of the relies to reach the external network [22].
The multi-phase data exfiltration scheme minimizes
anomalous data flows across network boundaries.
• String obfuscation. Critical strings in the malware
executables are obfuscated to evade signature-based
anti-virus detection [21]. The strings include criti-
cal process names for scanning and NetBIOS com-
mands for uploading data to the internal repository.
• Self-destructive code. The malware avoids unneces-
sary infections to minimize its exposure. It de-
stroys/deletes itself if the infected environment is
not within its targets [23]. This behavior reduces the
risk of being detected in an unfamiliar environment.
• Data encryption. The retrieved credit card informa-
tion is encrypted in the file “Winxml.dll” in each
POS terminal before it is sent to the internal repos-
itory. The encryption guarantees that no credit card
numbers are sent in plaintext, which hides the leak
from traditional data loss prevention (DLP) systems.
• Constrained communication. Communications in the
internal network are programed during office hours
of the day [20]. Busy office hour traffic helps hide
anomalous communications between infected POS
terminals and the compromised internal repository.
• Customized attack vector. Internal IP addresses and
login credentials of compromised servers are hard-
coded in the malware. It indicates the malware
author is aware of the internal network. The coun-
termeasures against detections are deliberately de-
signed along with the data exfiltration process.
3.3 Malware Development and Marketing
The Target breach attracts considerable attention to
BlackPOS and similar POS malware, e.g., vSkimmer [24]
and Dexter [25]. Several investigations have been per-
formed to disclose the development and marketing of
these pieces of malware. Terrogence web intelligence
company tracked the sales of the malware on under-
ground markets and pointed out BlackPOS was first
posted for sale in February 2013 [19]. Cybercrime intel-
ligence firm IntelCrawler indicated Rinat Shibaev, a 17-
year-old boy, and Rinat Shabayev, a 23-year-old Russian
man, are the principle developers of BlackPOS [26].
Andrew Komarov, CEO of the company, also hinted that
6 more retailer breaches are linked to BlackPOS [27].
iSIGHT Partners, working with United States Secret
Service, investigated the POS malware market and con-
cluded a growing demand for such malware since 2010.
FBI tracked about 20 data breach attacks in recent years
and warned retailers about this increasing threat [28].
4 PROSECUTION OF DATA BREACHES
The Target data breach is still under investigation and
there is no arrest known to the public. Tracking down
data breach perpetrators is notoriously difficult, because
the criminals usually operate across the world to set
barriers for investigation and prosecution in terms of
various laws and complex treaties among countries.
In this section, we discuss i) the laws that apply to
cybercrimes, especially data breaches, ii) the difficulties
in data breach discovery and prosecution, and iii) a
precedent of investigation and sentence in the TJX breach
case happened in 2007.
4.1 Cybercrime Law and Regulations
The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is
the most applicable cybercrime law that applies to the
Target breach itself. Other laws against theft and misuse
of the wires apply, as well as specific laws prohibiting
the sale of credit cards and identity theft [29]. Under the
CFAA, unauthorized access to a computer engaged in
interstate commerce, which causes damage over $5,000,
is a crime punishable by 5 to 10 years in prison and up
to $250,000 damages, per offense. Subsequent violations
increase the potential penalty, and there are different
provisions and penalties for unauthorized access to gov-
ernment or financial computers. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation leads investigations and cases are prose-
cuted by the Department of Justice Computer Crimes
and Intellectual Property Division.
4.2 Barriers to Data Breach Investigation
Businesses, for a long time, declined to publically dis-
close a data breach in fear that the information would
hurt their reputation in the eyes of customers and in-
vestors would. Today, 47 states have data breach notifi-
cation laws. Although not uniform, these laws generally
require a business to report a data breach to affected
customers when personally identifiable information has
been lost. The requirement to report a data breach can
aid law enforcement in tracking down the criminals, and
arguably is an incentive for businesses to increase their
security.
In data breach plots, attackers usually hide their iden-
tities carefully using relays across the world in both the
penetration phase (hacking into the system) and the ex-
filtration phase (leaking the data out). The international
relays pose significant challenges for investigation and
prosecution. In the Target breach case, two drop sites
are found in Miami and Brazil, and the final aggregation
server where all data is sent is discovered in Russia.
There is no guarantee that all involved countries take the
same level of effort as the United States to help inves-
tigate the incident. Each country is affected differently
by the breach, let alone the complicated relations mixed
with cooperation and divergences among them.
In addition, if cyber criminals are from outside the
United States then an arrest requires extradition from the
foreign country. In order to extradite for prosecution, the
United States and the country must be signatories to a
treaty agreeing to such cooperation. Many countries in
Asia, Africa and the Middle East do not have treaties
with the United States. Even with a treaty, extradition
involves a complicated process.
64.3 TJX Breach and the Sentence
Before the Target data breach, 45.6 million credit
card numbers and PINs were stolen in the TJX data
breach [30]. The breach was fully investigated and the
criminals were prosecuted and sentenced. The case sets
a record for credit card breach as well as the stiffest
sentence for a cybercrime. We describe details of the
investigation from both technical and legal aspects.
Albert Gonzalez, an American hacker, plotted the TJX
data breach from July 2005 to January 2007. In addition
to the TJX case, he was also charged with data breaches
in BJ’s Wholesale Club, Boston Market, Barnes & Noble,
Sports Authority, Forever 21, DSW and OfficeMax [31].
All aforementioned data breaches done by Gonzalez
were carried out with similar schemes. Taking the TJX
case as an example, Gonzalez started with war-driving
along Route No. 1 in Miami to discover vulnerable
retailer’s hotspots. With the help of his accomplices –
especially Stephen Watt, the author of the sniffer used
in the data breaches – Gonzalez employed delicate SQL
injections to gain access to the database and to install the
sniffer software into the servers. Credit cards informa-
tion was sniffed using ARP spoofing techniques and was
uploaded onto two foreign servers leased by Gonzalez
in Latvia and Ukraine.
After obtaining the credit card information, Gonzalez
sold the credit card numbers and PINs to a Ukrainian
card seller Maksym Yastremskiy. Yastremskiy paid Gon-
zalez totaling $400,000 through 20 electronic funds trans-
fers via e-gold during 2006 [32]. He peddled the stolen
credit card information to other card sellers in the un-
derground market. In 2007, Yastremskiy was arrested on
a separate charge, i.e., hacking into 12 banks in Turkey.
In May 2008, Gonzalez was apprehended with $1.1
million cash, a 2006 BMW, a diamond and other assets.
He schemed to earn $15 million from a series of data
breaches, according to his chat logs found by the gov-
ernment. He worked as an informant for the U.S. Secret
Service before he was arrested.
Gonzalez was sentenced on March 25th and 26th, 2010
for the TJX case and the Heartland Payment Systems
case, respectively. U.S. District Judge Patti Saris sen-
tenced Gonzalez to 20 years in prison, and U.S. District
Court Judge Douglas P. Woodlock sentenced Gonzalez
to 20 years for the Heartland Payment Systems case.
According to the negotiation between Gonzalez and the
government, the sentences run concurrently [33] and
Gonzalez would be imprisoned for a total of 20 years,
which has reached record high on cybercrime [34].
5 LESSONS LEARNED TOWARD BETTER AND
MORE EFFECTIVE SECURITY SOLUTIONS
As we discussed in Section 2.2, there are several mistakes
made by Target in the incident, including i) ignoring
critical security alerts, ii) improper segmentation of its
network and iii) insecure point of sale data handling. In
this section, we analyze these three points in details and
propose better design and more effective practices for
developing and deploying security solutions.
5.1 Enforcing Payment System Integrity
In the Target breach, BlackPOS was installed on Target’s
point of sale terminals, and the integrity of POS systems
was compromised. This key step for data breach can
be prevented by enforcing the integrity of point of
sale terminals. Therefore, we provide a practical scheme
using digital signatures and certificates for ensuring the
integrity of operating systems on point of sales.
The workflow of our POS integrity scheme is shown in
Fig. 4. Our key idea is to allow only trusted executables
running on POS machines. An executable is trusted if it
is verified/audited and digitally signed by the merchant,
i.e., Target Corp.
Executable verification techniques such as digital sig-
nature for executables are known for a long time, and
many modern operating systems provide utilities toward
the goal, e.g., Microsoft Authenticode [35]. However, the
execution policy is usually difficult to be enforced on a
normal consumer’s computer because there are a variety
of software providers on the Internet. Users may install
software or run programs from providers whose identify
cannot be verified. Public key infrastructure (PKI) helps
relieve the issue, but it does not completely solve it due
to the complexity introduced by the variety of software
providers.
However, this approach is useful and practical in
the dedicated environment where i) POS terminals are
specifically used for processing transaction and ii) they
are possessed and controlled by the merchant, e.g., Tar-
get Corp. The first property ensures the software or
programs running on POS terminals are limited and
feasible to be audited. The second property guarantees
one centralized integrity center auditing and signing all
executables can be created.
There are two players, integrity center and POS terminal
and 5 steps in our integrity enforcement scheme. The
integrity center has four tasks: i) key generation, ii)
key distribution, iii) file auditing and iv) file signing.
The POS terminal is hardened by a policy that only
binaries signed by the merchant can execute. The five-
step-protocol is:
1. The integrity center generates a public-private key
pair 〈pk, sk〉 and creates a self-signed certificate Cert
containing pk.
2. The integrity center distributes Cert to every POS
terminal in the company. Cert is placed in the root
certificate list at each terminal.
3. The integrity center audits every binary that needs
to be executed on POS, e.g., programs, installers,
system patches, etc. and signs the binary with sk
(encrypting the hash of the binary with sk).
4. The signed binary is sent over the merchant net-
work to POS terminals.
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Fig. 4. Our POS code update protocol with enhanced code integrity and authenticity verification.
5. The POS terminal checks the binary signature using
pk in Cert (encrypting the signature with pk to
verify whether it is the hash of the binary) and
executes only the ones correctly signed with sk.
Adopting our payment system integrity enforcement
protocol, merchants can achieve the following two secu-
rity goals in their system.
• system integrity: only trusted programs are allowed
to be executed or installed on the payment system,
which excludes the possibility of malware infection
on point of sale devices.
• program authenticity: every program or piece of soft-
ware should pass the test at integrity center before it
is executed on point of sale machines, which allows
merchants to have the full control of the payment
system functionalities.
5.2 Developing Effective Security Alert Systems
Target had been warned multiple times by a malware
detection tool produced by FireEye Inc [36], [37]. Un-
fortunately, the monitoring team in Bangalore for Target
Corp. took no actions in response to these alerts. They
also turned off the functionality that can automatically
remove a detected malware. These two serious mistakes
hindered the detection of the leakage of millions of credit
card information. For large corporations, processing a
large number of security alerts produced by protection
systems is challenging, if possible at all. Many of these
alerts are usually false alarms, which seasoned security
analysts learn to safely ignore. In this subsection, we first
discuss the design of FireEye alerts, and then explore
new out-of-box design strategies to improve the effec-
tiveness of alerts.
5.2.1 FireEye Alerts
The raw data output from FireEye Threat Prevention
Platform is in XML structure. Fig. 5 shows a FireEye alert
of a piece of malware [38]. Basic information about the
malware is provided, such as type and severity. Anoma-
lous behaviors of the malware are tracked and listed
in malicious-alert. The classtype=“anomaly-tag” indicates
that this alert is triggered because of anomaly behavior
detected. The msg and display−msg briefly describe the
content of this alert.
In the Target case, FireEye alerted the administrators
with type “malware”, which is commonly seen in large
companies or organizations. However, no sufficient de-
tailed information was provided, e.g., the name of the
malware or the data exfiltration behavior of the malware.
Since the BlackPOS software, which extracts and steals
sensitive financial information, is regarded as a zero-
day malware and few administrators have experience
dealing with it, the alerts were ignored [37].
5.2.2 Security Alert Design
Security alert systems are at the front line of cyber
defense. They represent the first opportunity to detect,
prevent, and stop attacks. Because human analysts are
error-prone and tend be undertrained, making alert sys-
tems more usable and intelligent is critical.
The needs for designing effective security warnings
have been studied. Sunshine et al. studied the effective-
ness of SSL warning [39]. Akhawe and Felt investigated
the browser warnings including malware, phishing and
SSL warnings [40]. Modic and Anderson proposed to
adopt social-psychological techniques to increase the
compliment for the warnings [41].
Our thesis advocated in this paper on warnings differs
from the existing security alert research. We consider
the security protection needs for large companies and
corporations that produce hundreds of alerts on daily
basis. In these scenarios, the alert systems need to handle
and differentiate warnings with a varying degrees of
urgency.
We argue that the design of alert systems needs to be
adaptive and intelligent, beyond simply sending a list of
8Fig. 5. A FireEye alert in XML.
alerts. Specifically, we propose two design strategies for
security alerts:
• Adaptive warning strength. Existing security systems
provide severity information along with each alert,
but there is no guarantee that important alerts are
not ignored by administrators. Thus, we propose
two methods to strengthen the efficiency of alerts:
– Raise the severity level of an alert when it is
not handled within a limited amount of time.
The purpose is to force security analysts to take
actions toward severe alerts. This method is not
applicable to all alerts, especially the less severe
ones. Otherwise, it requires the administrators
to address all alerts in the end, which may not
be practical.
– Besides color, font size, length of the alert bar,
the system can raise alerts in different forms.
For example, popping up flashing messages for
the most critical alerts, emailing different level
of alerts to different group of people.
The multiform alarming method utilizes differ-
ent ways to interact with different people. It also
informs people who are not directly in charge
of the issue to remind security analysts if issues
are not solved for a long time.
• Mining and presenting connections among alerts. One
drawback of existing detection solution is the lack
of ability to correlate alert events. Some alert events
could belong to a single attack vector and happen in
sequence. Sophisticated modern attacks are usually
well planned and realized in steps. An alert may be
triggered for each step, e.g., malware injected, file
transmission. Connecting these alerts can reveal a
grander scheme of the plot.
One approach to connect alerts is to analyze the
consequences of each malicious event. The conse-
quences can be used to bridge alerts, connecting
multiple alerts in different types to a plot. If the col-
lection alerts indicate potential grander data breach,
then sever alerts should be raised.
5.3 Controlling Information Flow with Network Seg-
mentation
Target failed to segment its sensitive assets from normal
network portions, which allows an attacker to escalate
the intrusion if he/she attacks from the inside. We
explain the severity of this issue.
The most common strategies used in network architec-
ture are techniques based on building a strong exterior,
so that only those a system can trust can get inside.
Because the only people inside are those who can be
trusted, security on the internal network is either low
or none existent. An example of this goes back to the
Target breach. Once the attacker obtained the security
credentials from Fazio Mechanical Services, they then
had the ability to gain access into Target’s network. From
there they compromised three FTP servers and installed
malware on many point of sales devices [7].
The security principle advocated in a zero trust net-
work [16] is simply don’t trust anyone. This means
all traffic is identified, authorized, and monitored. This
makes all parts of the network secure regardless of
location. In addition, virtual LANs cannot provide much
security defense, because they cannot stop an intruder
from gaining access into other portions of the network.
The Target incidence demonstrates that virtual LANs,
especially when not configured properly, is ineffective
against the criminals.
While the zero trust strategy protects from outsider
attacks it also protects against insider attacks because
all traffic is monitored and analyzed. If a member of
a network does something unusual, e.g. deletes several
9entries in a database that he or she usually does not
access, the network administrators can detect the change
in behaviors. However, this strategy has the trade-off for
usability because monitoring all traffic leads to extremely
huge computation power. And it is not convenient for
practical usage in large scale networks.
6 CREDIT CARD SECURITY AND BEST PRAC-
TICES FOR CUSTOMERS
Target and other breach incidents, e.g., Neiman Marcus,
Sally’s Beauty and PF Chang’s, suggests that there is a
high risk at current credit card regulation and technol-
ogy. In this section, we discuss the issues in credit card
regulation as well as advantages and problems of new
technologies for securing credit card transactions.
6.1 Credit Card Administration and Regulation
Payment card security is self-regulated by the con-
tract between the merchant and the card company. Ma-
jor credit card companies require compliance with the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-
DSS) [42]. The description of Targets security, such
as weak password at the POS, would not seem to
meet many of the standards, thus drawing attention to
whether the private contract self-regulation framework
is effective.
6.2 EMV: Toward a More Secure Payment System
EMV (Europay, MasterCard, and Visa) payment system
is the major technology developed to address the secu-
rity issue in credit cards [43]. The EMV system adds a
temper-resistant chip to a credit card. The chip stores
confidential account information and provides on-chip
cryptographic computations such as encryption and dig-
ital signing. The system works by authenticating through
the chip and identifying the user by either a signature
or a pin; this is where the system gets its name of chip
and pin. The difference between the EMV system and
the traditional magnetic strip system is that the data on
the card’s chip is encrypted. Therefore it would be much
more difficult for an attacker to commit fraud.
However, a flaw is found in the design of the trans-
action protocol, which makes EMV ineffective. A no-pin
attack is the scenario where the criminal has the card
but not the pin. Murdech et al. show that by using an
electric device between the card and the terminal, the
terminal can be tricked into believing that the criminal
has the correct pin even though he doesn’t [44].
Another vulnerability is found in Point of Sale termi-
nals. A POS terminal in the EMV system is assumed
temper-resistant, meaning that no one can open the
POS box and read/write to the internal circuits. Un-
fortunately, real EMV-equipped POS terminals can be
tempered and authentication codes can be obtained and
used at a later time on the same terminal to make
additional transactions. Several criminals in Spain made
use of this vulnerability as well as a vulnerability found
in ATM random number generators. An ATM may gen-
erate predictable random numbers which gives criminals
temporary access to credit card spending if the number
is guessed correctly.
Besides the two vulnerabilities, the most severe flaw in
the EMV system is the card not present (such as when
a purchase is made online) fraud abbreviated as CNP
fraud. CNP fraud now accounts for over fifty percent of
fraud in the United Kingdom where the EMV system is
currently being used [45]. The EMV system is designed
for securing card-present transactions, and it has nothing
in place to prevent CNP fraud from occurring, which is
why criminals are now using CNP fraud as their go to
choice in fraudulent purchases.
6.3 Tokenization and Best Practices for Customers
Tokenization is a payment technology to minimize credit
card information by merchants during transactions. In
this section, we describe the technology and explain
why it helps protect personal account information. We
give customers best practices to hide their credit card
information when shopping.
With tokenization a customer asks an acquirer to act
between he/she and the merchant. The acquirer i) takes
the customer’s credit card information c, ii) generates a
one-time token t based on c (t is independent of c), and
iii) sends t to the merchant to process the transaction. t
is bound to the merchant and can be nullified after the
transaction.
There are two approaches to utilize an acquirer. One
is to pay through acquirer systems. Available systems
include PayPal, Amazon payment, Google wallet and
Apple pay. For example, customer Alice wants to buy
an item in Amazon market from seller Bob. Alice can
pay through the Amazon payment system and Bob only
receives a token to process the transaction. Google wallet
and Apple pay extend the service from online shopping
to in-store purchases. They also provide contactless fea-
ture through near field communication (NFC), so that
Alice does not need to swipe a card to authorize a
purchase.
The second approach to utilize an acquirer is to gen-
erate a one-time credit card number at acquirer banks.
Bank of America and Citibank provide such service,
namely ShopSafe and virtual card number, respectively.
PayPal used to have a similar service and Discover
terminated its virtual card service on March 16, 2014.
7 CONCLUSION
There is no silver bullet in cyber space against data
breaches. With the increasing amount of data leak in-
cidents in recent years, it is important to analyze the
weak points in our systems, techniques and legislations
and to seek solutions to the issue. In this paper, we
presented a comprehensive analysis of the Target data
breach and related incidents, such as the TJX breach. We
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described several security guidelines to enhance security
in merchants’ systems. We presented the state-of-the-
art credit card security techniques, and gave customers
best practices to hide card information during purchase
transactions.
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